Item description for Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya, 1911-1912 (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia) by Timothy W. Childs...
In 1911 Italy, an aspiring Great Power, attacked Ottoman Libya. Italian diplomacy had long anticipated this attack, but Italy's military was ill-prepared for it. The Ottoman Empire, distracted by internal dissension and by the expansionist designs of its Balkan neighbours, was woefully unready. This study examines how the belligerents dealt with the military and diplomatic stalemates into which the Libyan War degenerated, stalemates which were ended only by the outbreak of the First Balkan War in 1912, when the Ottomans were obliged to make peace with Italy to face more dangerous enemies nearer home. The Italo-Turkish War was the first armed clash between the lesser Great Powers immediately before 1914, leading inexorably to the deterioration of the Balkan situation and to Sarajevo. This is the first study based on the archives of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry for the period, as well as on better-known Italian sources.
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Studio: Brill Academic Publishers
Est. Packaging Dimensions: Length: 9.5" Width: 6.4" Height: 1" Weight: 1.4 lbs.
Release Date Aug 1, 1997
Publisher Brill Academic Publishers
ISBN 9004090258 ISBN13 9789004090255
Reviews - What do customers think about Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya, 1911-1912 (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia)?
Essential Reading for WW One Diplomacy Buffs Oct 10, 2006
I rate this as 5 stars. this site's system won't let me correct the erroneous rating of 3 stars. Mr. Childs has written the definitive account of the contradictory, ultimately self-defeating efforts of the Italians and Turks to reach a diplomatic finale to this pathetic war. As becomes all too obvious, the sitting-on-hands approach by the Great Powers (which the Italians depserately wanted to be, but alas, post-Adua, were doomed to never achieve) only invited the Balkan sharks to circle the wounded Ottoman prey, leading inevitably to Sarajevo, the July Crisis and the world we live in today. What is astonishing is that many in Europe (including many Italians) feared that the Italian incursion would precipitate a domino-effect, which we all now know it did with catastrophic consequences for world history, yet felt compelled by the prevailing ideologies of imperialism and nationalistic/racial aggrandizement to proceed anyway. The Turks were as myopic as everyone else, though, and clung to the bitter end to the idea that the calcified, rotting Empire could be preserved for yet a little while longer, when in truth the corpse had been interred many years before. I could not help but parallel this unprovoked, white nation agression against a Muslim nation with our present imbroglios in the Middle East. The Italians similarly achieved a swift military vistory, but never possessed much more than the land their troops occupied, and had to fight a guerilla insurgency for another 20 years. As a result of the militarism engendered by this and the subsequent Great War, Italy sank into the stupor of Fascist Dictatorship. One cannot help but wonder if the USA will not follow a similar road to ruin with its imperialist ambitions.
Rome versus the Sublime Porte in a diplomatic bluffing war. Mar 10, 2001
This is a very detailed diplomatic history of the causes, international ramifications, and results of the Italo-Turkish war over Lybia and the Dodecanese islands. Very little information regarding the war itself is given as this is almost exclusively a diplomatic history.
Italy, a second rate power still smarting from their defeat in Ethiopia, used the French extension of power in Morocco as cover to invade Ottoman-held Lybia under the flimsiest pretenses. Quickly controlling the coastal regions, Italy soon found itself in a military and diplomatic stalemate with the Ottomans in the Lybian hinterland. Great Power indifference lead to an expansion of the war to the Aegean and a temporary closing of the Straits. It was only the beginning of the First Balkan War which threatened Ottoman possessions in Europe which hastened the Porte to the bargaining table.
The internal politics at Constantinople and Rome are both thoroughly discussed as background to the diplomatic maneuverings of both nations. These are particularly interesting given the turbulent situation in the Ottoman government at the time. Turkey's future alliance with the Central Powers and the Italian government's predilection towards fascism have their roots in the events of this period. Italy's schizophrenic diplomatic stance with Turkey (robbing them in North Africa while propping them up in Europe) is fully explored. Diplomatic archives from both Turkey and Italy have been thoroughly utilized by the author. Primary sources from the foreign ministries of the Great Powers are also used to show Europe's reaction to this war. Secondary sources such as political memoirs give the main actors' apologia for their actions and Europe's subsequent death spiral into the Great War.
This is a fascinating and detailed rendering of what second and third rate power diplomacy was like at the end of the Concert of Europe.