Item description for Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956 (Atlantic studies on society in Change) by Jeno Gyorkei...
This is the first detailed account of Soviet Military operations in Hungary in 1956. Based on unpublished material in Soviet Archives which has only been recently reclassified, it also includes one of the very few memoirs of a high ranking Soviet officer ever published in the West.
This remarkable study reveals new material on the organization, command, strategy, and tactics of the Soviet armed forces which invaded Hungary in 1956. Particularly interesting is the precise documentation of the irrationally large size of the forces. However, the major contribution made by the book is its source material and this alone makes the volume of enormous scholarly importance.
The book opens with a substantial introductory essay by the editors, and includes a major study by Alexandr Kirov, based on research in Soviet military archives. One of the real strengths of the book is that it also includes the memoirs of General Yevgeny Malashenko, in 1956 a colonel in the Soviet Army and acting Chief of Staff of the Special Corps in Budapest, who provided unparalleled insights into Soviet military procedures, politico-military co-operation, and the actual fighting strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army. Very few other high-ranking Soviet officers have ever published their memoirs in the West.
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Studio: Central European University Press
Est. Packaging Dimensions: Length: 9.29" Width: 6.29" Height: 1.37" Weight: 1.65 lbs.
Publisher Central European University Press
ISBN 963911636X ISBN13 9789639116368
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New Insights on the 1956 Crisis Jun 10, 2000
Jeno Gyorkei and Miklos Horvath, eds. _Soviet MilitaryIntervention in Hungary, 1956_ . Trans. Emma Roper Evans. Budapest:Central European University Press, 1999. xv + 318 pp. Tables, photographs, maps, endnotes, biographical notes. (cloth), ISBN 963-9116-36X ; (paper), ISBN 963 9116 35 1.
The _Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956_ , edited by Jeno Gyorkei of the Military History Institute in Budapest, and Miklos Horvath, of the Hungarian Army's Political College, is a worthy addition to the series of books by Columbia University Press (Atlantic Studies on Society in Change ) that surveys many aspects of East Central European society.  Originally published in Hungarian in 1996, this book consists of three essays, each about one hundred pages, by Gyorkei and Horvath, Alexander Kirov, and Yevgeny Malashenko, respectively . All three selections primarily focus on Soviet and Hungarian military actions in the 1956 crisis, rather than the Soviet decision making process, or the influence of other Warsaw Pact countries. In the book's preface, Bela Kiraly, the chief editor of the series and a key participant in the 1956 events, poses--and then answers--four questions about the Hungarian crisis, which have preoccupied scholars from former communist countries. First, was the 1956 uprising a revolution or counter-revolution? If it was a revolution, did it succeed or fail? As Kiraly contends, "Without 1956 the radical changes of the `lawful revolution' that commenced in 1989 and is still in progress would not have happened, or if it had, it would not have been what it is today." (xiv) (The Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution on May 2, 1990 classifying the events of 1956 as a "revolution" and "war of independence.") Second, was the introduction of Soviet troops an aggressive act, or did it constitute military aid to a beleaguered socialist state that had requested it? Kiraly confirms that the Soviet actions did amount to war by pointing out the size of the Soviet military force used in Hungary in the November 4 intervention (17 divisional units), the number of Soviet casualties (722 men killed, 1,251 wounded), and the number of medals awarded to Soviet soldiers (26 "Hero of the Soviet Union" medals, 10,000 combat medals). Kiraly argues that if the USSR had to exert such a great effort, this could not have constituted mere "aid" to Hungary. (Let us also remember Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy's last radio appeal at 5:20 a.m. on November 4, in which he states that the USSR "attacked our capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legitimate Hungarian democratic government." In addition, on October 24, 1991, as reported by _ Izvestiia _, the Soviet Supreme Council categorically condemned the Soviet troop intervention, acknowledging it as an interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. ) Thirdly, was there indeed armed conflict between "socialist" states? Kiraly asserts that Hungary had no intention in 1956 of completely abandoning socialism, and therefore the Soviet Union did attack another socialist state. Finally, was the declaration of neutrality on November 1 the cause, or the effect, of Soviet aggression? Kiraly states that Nagy's declaration was merely the effect; by November 1 Khrushchev and his colleagues were already informing other Warsaw Pact leaders in Bucharest, and on the island of Brioni the following day of impending action. (....)Kiraly, commander-in-chief of the National Gua END