Item description for The Atlantic Wall: Hitler's Defenses for D-Day 1941-1944 by Alan F. Wilt & Carlo E'Este...
A study of the planning and thinking that went into the creation of Hitler's "Atlantic Wall," which was intended to prevent the D-Day invasion and throw Allied soldiers back into the sea. The book details how and why the Atlantic Wall failed to perform as Hitler intended.
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Est. Packaging Dimensions: Length: 0.75" Width: 6.5" Height: 9.25" Weight: 1.14 lbs.
Release Date Jan 1, 2004
Publisher Enigma Books
ISBN 1929631197 ISBN13 9781929631193
Availability 1 units. Availability accurate as of Mar 23, 2017 04:26.
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Reviews - What do customers think about The Atlantic Wall: Hitler's Defenses for D-Day 1941-1944?
Same as the old edtion, little fort detail Feb 13, 2006
This is basically an updated version, but is mainly a history with little description of the various types of fortifications that made up the great German defensive barrier.
A very good overview of Germany's strategy in the West Oct 14, 2004
I decided to buy this book despite the bad critics it received and I was not disappointed. The author has a clear argument regarding the construction of the Atlantic Wall, the strategic and operational reasons behind this decision and the German command arrangements and frictions in the West. The books does not go in great lengths regarding the details but it uses the kind of first hand information that applies to me: the microfilmed archives of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) and a welth of other German sources. The writing style is very good albeit with a few mistakes due to bad editing and the information is presented in a very clear chronological way which captivates the reader. I had never before pay attention, for example, to von Rundsetdt's 50 pages report of October 23, 1944 and the consequences of his estimations, nor had I read in such a clear form about the German plans and moves regarding the possible Allied attacks in Portugal, Spain and Southern France. Although very few pages are devoted to the actual operations of the D-Day landings, the subsquent Normandy campaign and the 15 August landings in the French Mediterranean coast, and almost none to the Allied planning and intentions, I think that Alan Wilt has made clear his point that Atlantic Wall did achieve a part of his objective by keeping the Allies out of the important Atlantic ports and thus causing the great logistics crisis of September 1944. "The Atlantic Wall" is a very good book which will be useful as a quick reference to anyone interested in the German strategy in the West during the 1940-44 period. The reader must be warned though that the subtitle "Rommel's plans to thwart the Allied Invasion" is rather deceptive, as Rommel is not the central figure of this study nor the only one. The book is easy to read and contains some good general maps, among them a precise map of the German order of battle in June 1944 and although it does not avoid a few reptitions along the way, it is worth the money.
Disappointing and dull Jun 24, 2004
This book is a narrative of the plans and construction of defenses on the French coasts, both Atlantic and Mediterranean, as well as the German war plans for defending against the Allied invasion they knew was coming. The Germans did a great job of building formidable defenses for the seaports, which the Allies bypassed. Obviously, the Germans could have done a lot more to defend the Normandy beaches if they had only known the Allied plans.
The basic problem with the book is the author's fondness for the passive tense and vague rhetoric, and the lack of a theme. The maps are excellent and numerous. The writing style is smooth but the lack of specificity makes much of the book meaningless.
The book's purported theme seems to be that the Allied invasion could have failed. Given the success of the Allied deception and their total domination of the air, and given also the lack of mobility of the Germans with most bridges out and constant air attacks during the daytime, the thesis seems unlikely, or at least not supported by the facts presented in this disappointing book. The author has done a lot of research but to what end?